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I.

INTRODUCTION

United States immigration law unfairly impacts the lives of
lesbian and gay couples in committed bi-national relationships and
is a glaring exception to a growing trend in western democracies
towards recognition of immigration rights for same-sex bi-national
couples. Under federal immigration law, U.S. citizens and legal
permanent residents do not have the right to sponsor their samesex partners for immigration benefits, a right afforded U.S. citizens
and lawful permanent residents in opposite-sex bi-national
marriages. As a result, many bi-national same-sex couples in this
country face separation or forced exile, having to find a country
that will recognize their relationship while satisfying its
immigration requirements. While some foreign nationals qualify
for U.S. visas and residency independent of their relationship to a
U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, the majority have no
alternative means to immigrate to this country.
U.S. immigration law and policy towards lesbians and gay
men has a long, ugly history. Over time, however, as social,
political and governmental attitudes changed to be more tolerant
of gay people, so too did immigration laws. Gay and lesbian
foreign nationals are no longer excluded from entering the United
States and are no longer barred from adjusting their status to lawful
permanent residents as a result of their sexual orientation.
Immigration law must again be modified to reflect contemporary
social, political, governmental, and legal acceptance of alternative
family arrangements, specifically the relationships of same-sex
1
couples.

1. Currently, marriages between same-sex couples are recognized
nationwide in five countries: Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, South Africa and
Spain. See infra note 61. On May 17, 2004, following the 2003 Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts ruling that denying marriage and its protections to samesex couples is unconstitutional under the equality and liberty provisions of the
Massachusetts Constitution, Massachusetts became the first state in the United
States to allow same-sex couples to marry. Alan Cooperman & Jonathan Finer, Gay
Couples Marry in Massachusetts, WASH. POST, May 18, 2004, at A1; see Goodridge v.
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Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003).
Civil unions and other forms of legal recognition for same-sex couples,
which offer most if not all the rights accorded in a civil marriage, exist nationwide
in Denmark, Norway, Israel (in the form of common law marriage), Sweden,
Greenland, Hungary, Iceland, France, South Africa, Germany, Portugal, Finland,
Croatia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Andorra, Slovenia, and
Switzerland (approved 2005; expected implementation 2007). See infra notes 6165, 74; Establishment and Termination of Cohabitation, HUNGARY.HU, July 30, 2003,
http://www.magyarorszag.hu/angol/orszaginfo/ugyleiras/csalad/ellettars/kapcs
olatkotese/egyutteles_szabalyai_a.html (description of cohabitation status from
Hungarian Government Portal website); International Gay and Lesbian Human
Rights Commission, Croatian Law on Same Sex Civil Unions,
http://www.iglhrc.org/site/iglhrc/content.php?type=1&id=73
(English
translation of the Croatian law on civil unions) (last visited Jan. 12, 2006); Le
Gouvernement de Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, La loi relative aux effets légaux
de certains partenariats, http://www.gouvernement.lu/dossiers/justice/
partenariat/ (French text of Luxembourg law on registered partnerships available
from Luxembourg Government website); Buttletí Oficial del Principat d’Andorra
(BOPA), http://www.bopa.ad/bopa.nsf/b84c2e9d2d34fe50c1256ad9003b8903
/9559566b4feb8d3dc1256fcd002754ea!OpenDocument (Catalan text of the
Andorran registered partnership law); Republic of Slovenia National Assembly,
http://www.dzrs.si/index.php?id=101&type=98&vt=6&sm=k&docid=5025&showdo
c=1&unid=SZ%7CC12563A400338836C12570280058F84F (Slovenian text of
Slovenia registered partnership law (ZRIPS) passed June 22, 2005); Gay Couples
Win Partnership Rights, SWISSPOLITICS.ORG, June 5, 2005, http://www.swisspolitics
.org/en/news/index.php?page =dossier_artikel&story_id=5845155&dossier_id=80
(reporting on Swiss voter approval of registered partnership law); OUTfront!
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual & Transgender Human Rights, International Briefs—
Summer 2005, http://www.amnesty usa.org/outfront/briefs.html (noting that
Greenland recognizes Denmark’s civil union law).
Within the United States, individual states provide for civil unions or
domestic partnerships between same-sex couples. Vermont and Connecticut
currently grant protections to same-sex couples through civil unions. The
Vermont civil union legislation provides: “Parties to a civil union shall have all the
same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive
from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source
of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1204(a) (2004). The Connecticut civil union law affords those legally joined in a
civil union all the same benefits, protections, and responsibilities under law that
are granted to spouses in marriage in categories such as state and municipal
taxation, family leave benefits, hospital visitation and notification, state public
assistance benefits, and court privileges. 2005 Conn. Acts 05-10 (Reg. Sess.).
Domestic partnerships are recognized by dozens of cities and a handful of
states. Pursuant to the Domestic Partners Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003
(A.B. 205), as of January 1, 2005, registered domestic partners in California have
most of the rights and responsibilities given to married spouses under California
state law. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2005). On January 12, 2004, the New
Jersey Governor signed into law the “Domestic Partnership Act.” The rights
provided to domestic partners include: the right to make medical or legal
decisions for an incapacitated domestic partner, the right to consent for an
autopsy, the right to authorize donation of the deceased partner’s organs, the
right to be exempt from New Jersey inheritance tax on the same grounds as a
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Congress has the opportunity to pass the Uniting American
Families Act; proposed legislation that would afford U.S. citizens
and legal permanent residents the right to sponsor their same-sex
2
partners for immigration benefits. The Supreme Court ruling in
3
Lawrence v. Texas and the recognition of same-sex couples for
immigration benefits by eighteen countries worldwide make a
strong legal and moral case for Congress to pass the proposed
legislation and grant immigration benefits to bi-national same-sex

spouse, the right to be eligible for dependent benefits under the stateadministered retirement system, and the right to domestic partner health benefits
for state employees. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-2 (2004); see also Domestic Partnership
Act, 2004 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 246 (West).
On April 28, 2004, Maine’s Governor John Baldacci signed the state’s first
domestic partnership law into effect. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (2004);
see also 2004 Me. Legis. Serv. 672 (West). The law provides a handful of rights to
domestic partners including the right to intestate succession, the right to elect
against the will, the right to make funeral and burial arrangements, the right to
receive victim’s compensation, and preferential status to be named as guardian
and/or conservator in the event of the death of a domestic partner. See 2004 Me.
Legis. Serv. 672.
Several other states and individual cities provide more limited benefits
and protections for domestic partners. For instance, in 1997, the Hawaii
legislature passed the Reciprocal Beneficiaries law. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
572C-4 (LexisNexis 2004). The Reciprocal Beneficiaries law allows any two single
adults who are not eligible to marry under state law to have access to
approximately sixty state-conferred rights, benefits, and responsibilities of
marriage, including the right to sue for wrongful death, the right to inherit
intestate, the right to hospital visitation, the right to make medical decisions, and
some property rights. See Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples,
Reciprocal Beneficiaries: The Hawaiian Approach, Oct. 23, 2005, http://www.
buddybuddy.com/d-p-hawa.html. The District of Columbia has recognized samesex partnerships since 2002. D.C. CODE §§ 32-701 to -710 (2001) (including
domestic partners as “family members” for the purposes of health care). All
couples registered as domestic partners are entitled to the same rights as legal
family members to visit their domestic partners in hospitals and to make decisions
concerning the treatment of a domestic partner’s remains after the partner’s
death. Id. The measure also grants rights to a number of benefits to District of
Columbia government employees. Id. Domestic partners are eligible for health
care insurance policies, can use annual leave or unpaid leave for the birth or
adoption of a dependent child and/or care for their domestic partner or their
dependants, and/or arrange for or attend the funeral. Id.
Finally, eleven states—California, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington—and
the District of Columbia provide domestic partner benefits for the domestic
partners of state employees. NCLR Publications, Marriage, Domestic Partnerships,
and Civil Unions, http://www.nclrights.org/publications/marriage_equality
0905.htm.
2. See infra Part III.B.
3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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4

couples. Likewise, providing immigration equality for same-sex
couples would further U.S. obligations under international law,
which were implicitly recognized by Lawrence, to protect and
promote the right to family and family unity.
II. THE HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN UNDER
U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW
This country’s discriminatory immigration law and policy
against lesbians and gay men dates back to the Immigration Act of
1917 when Congress first codified a ban against gay people seeking
5
to enter the United States.
In 1952, the Immigration and
Nationality Act repealed the 1917 Act, but continued to exclude
gay people as “afflicted with psychopathic personality . . . or a
6
mental defect.”
This categorization reflected the view that
7
homosexuality was a mental illness. Countless individuals have

4. Currently, the immigration laws and policies of Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Israel, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom allow gay and lesbian citizens to sponsor their same-sex partners for
immigration purposes. Susan Hazeldean & Heather Betz, Years Behind: What the
United States Must Learn About Immigration Law and Same-Sex Couples, HUM. RTS.
MAG. (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/summer03/immigration.
html; American Immigration Lawyers Association, Issue Paper, Permanent
Partners Act, http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid =8384.
5. See 8 U.S.C. § 136 (2000) (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 5, 1917, 39
Stat. 874, 875, repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act § 403(a)(13), (16), (18),
66 Stat. 279, 280 (1952)) (excluding those “certified by the examining surgeon as
mentally or physically defective”).
6. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 212(a)(4), 66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952)
(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2002)). The 1990 amendment excluded
“[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality, or sexual deviation, or a mental
defect,” and grouped homosexuality with six other medical grounds for exclusion:
mental retardation; insanity; one or more attacks of insanity; narcotic drug
addiction or chronic alcoholism; dangerous contagious disease; and physical
defect, disease, or disability that may affect the ability to earn a living. 8 U.S.C. §§
1182(a)(1)-(3), (5)-(7) (1988) (amended 1990).
7. Shannon Minter, Note, Sodomy and Public Morality Offenses Under U.S.
Immigration Law: Penalizing Lesbian and Gay Identity, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 771, 777
(1993) (discussing the political and legal barriers to asylum for homosexuals in
the United States). Congress deferred to the medical expertise of the Public
Health Service (PHS) and abandoned an initial draft of the Act that had
specifically named “homosexual and sex perverts” an excludable class. Id. The
PHS voiced concern about the difficulty of diagnosing homosexuality and advised
the legislature to use the more general language of “psychopathic personality or
mental defect” to make the diagnosis of homosexuals easier. Id. Congress
accepted the recommendation but registered the caveat that “[t]his change of
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been excluded at the border, deported, or denied naturalization
under this provision. Pursuant to statutory procedure under the
8
1952 Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
referred any person suspected of homosexuality to a Public Health
9
10
Service (PHS) official for an examination.
The PHS official
examined the individual, diagnosed the existence of a psychopathic
personality or other condition, and issued a certificate,
11
corresponding to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), to the INS officer.
The
certificate constituted the sole evidence for exclusion or
12
deportation of the foreign national.
The 1952 exclusion operated to ban lesbians and gay men
13
from entry into the United States until 1963 when the Ninth
14
Circuit held that it was void for vagueness. Congress responded
almost immediately to the court’s ruling and, to avoid any

nomenclature is not to be construed in any way as modifying the intent to exclude
all aliens who are sexual deviates.” Id.; see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL: MENTAL DISORDERS 38-39 (1952) (listing homosexuality
as a type of “sociopathic personality disturbance”).
8. On November 25, 2002, President George W. Bush signed the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 into law. U.S. Citizenship and Immig. Servs., INS to DHS:
Where is it now?, http://uscis.gov/graphics/othergov/roadmap.htm (last visited
Jan. 12, 2006). This law transferred INS functions to the newly enacted
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Id. Immigration enforcement
functions were placed directly within the Directorate of Border and
Transportation Security (BTS), or indirectly through Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) (including, Border Patrol and INS Inspections) or Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (which includes the enforcement and
investigation components of INS such as Investigations, Intelligence, Detention
and Removals). Id. As of March 1, 2003, the former INS was abolished and all
functions and units were incorporated into the new DHS. Id.
9. The Public Health Service is an agency in the Department of Health and
Human Services, headed by the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii).
PHS doctors are authorized to examine entering aliens at ports of entry and
overseas. See 8 U.S.C. § 1224.
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1222 (original version at 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1988)) (amended
1996); Minter, supra note 7, at 778.
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1222; Minter, supra note 7, at 778.
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (stating the immigration judge should decide “based
solely upon such certification”); Minter, supra note 7, at 778.
13. See, e.g., Quiroz v. Neely, 291 F.2d 906, 907 (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that
Congress had intended to exclude homosexuals and that the medical profession’s
understanding of the term “psychopathic personality” would not control).
14. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 1962), vacated on other
grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963) (“[T]he statutory term ‘psychopathic personality,’
when measured by common understanding and practices, does not convey
sufficiently definite warning that homosexuality and sex perversion are embraced
therein.”).
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ambiguity about its intention to exclude homosexuals, in 1965
amended the Act to specifically exclude from entry aliens who were
15
afflicted with a “sexual deviation”—i.e., homosexuals. However,
in 1967, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the term
16
“psychopathic personality” was unconstitutionally vague.
In its
decision, the Court examined the legislative history of the provision
17
and found a clear congressional intent to exclude homosexuals.
Despite Congress’s deference to medical expertise in drafting the
provision, the Court held that “psychopathic personality” was a
legal term of art independent of its clinical meaning in medical
18
discourse, and as such, clearly included homosexuality.
In 1973 the American Psychiatric Association removed
19
homosexuality from its official list of disorders. Six years later, in
1979, the PHS informed the INS that it would no longer certify
20
homosexuals as having psychopathic personalities. In 1980, the
Department of Justice reacted by announcing that despite the
action of the PHS, it continued to have a “legal obligation to
exclude homosexuals from entering the United States” because
21
Congress’s ban on “sexual deviation” was still in effect.
The
Department of Justice indicated that it would carry out that
obligation, however, “solely upon the voluntary admission by the
22
alien that he or she was homosexual.”
Unsurprisingly, the Justice Department’s new policy was
challenged and the courts split on the legality of excluding lesbians
and gay men from entering the United States on the basis of their
sexual orientation. In Hill v. INS, the Ninth Circuit ruled that gay
people could not be excluded from the United States without a

15. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919
(amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)) (amended again in 1990).
16. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 119 (1967).
17. Id. at 120.
18. Id. at 124.
19. Minter, supra note 7, at 779; see also SIMON LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE 222-25
(1996) (summarizing the history of the APA’s decision to remove homosexuality
from its list of disorders).
20. Memorandum from Julius Richmond, Assistant Sec. for Health, U.S.
Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, and Surgeon Gen. to William Foege and
George Lythcott (August 2, 1979); see also Minter, supra note 7, at 779.
21. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Guidelines and Procedures for the
Inspection of Aliens who are Suspected of Being Homosexual (Sept. 9, 1980)
[hereinafter Guidelines and Procedures]; see also Minter, supra note 7, at 779.
22. See Guidelines and Procedures, supra note 21.
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23

certification from the PHS.
Prior to the court’s decision, the
24
medical certificate could no longer be obtained. In In re Longstaff,
the Fifth Circuit reached the opposite result, denying petitioner’s
naturalization, as he had not been “lawfully admitted” into the
25
country because he was homosexual.
The Immigration Act of 1990 resolved the conflict among
26
the courts and eliminated the exclusionary provision altogether.
Under the 1990 Act, lesbians and gay men were no longer
automatically barred from entering or immigrating to the United
States. However, even after the 1990 Act, gay men and lesbians
were vulnerable to deportation, exclusion, or denial of citizenship
based on convictions for sodomy or public morality offenses under
the “crimes involving moral turpitude” or “good moral character”
27
exclusions still enshrined in immigration laws. Thus, although
the Immigration Act of 1990 eliminated the rationale for doing so,
the U.S. government continued to exercise its discretion to use
sodomy statutes to exclude and deport gay people from the
28
country, as well as to deny them citizenship. In Lawrence v. Texas,

23. 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).
24. On August 2, 1979, the Surgeon General announced that the PHS would
no longer issue certificates solely because an alien was suspected of being
homosexual. Id. at 1472.
25. 716 F.2d 1439, 1440 (5th Cir. 1983). Longstaff had been admitted to the
United States eighteen years earlier as a permanent resident. Id. In seeking
citizenship, Longstaff admitted that he had always been a homosexual. Id. at 1447.
His admission, had it been made at the time of his initial entry, would have
sufficed to exclude him even without a medical certificate. See id. at 1447-50
(contending that certification is not a prerequisite to barring an applicant’s
admission and that naturalization can be denied based on the applicant’s
voluntary admission that he or she is a homosexual).
26. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978,
5067-78 (1990) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1990)). The “psychopathic
personality” exclusion was eliminated after years of lobbying by openly gay
congressperson Barney Frank and others, and came in the wake of the litigation
outlined above. Minter, supra note 7, at 771. The elimination was part of a
“general reform of the old exclusion laws.” Id. at 771-72, 780. Moreover, by this
time, the “terminology used in the provision was medically obsolete.” Id. at 780.
27. Immigration and Nationality Act (McCarran-Walter Act), ch. 477, §
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2000)); see id. § 316(a)(3) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1427(a)(3) (2000)); see also Minter, supra note 7, at 772 (explaining that in the
aftermath of the Immigration Act of 1990, “lesbians and gay men convicted of
sodomy or of a public morality offense were at risk of exclusion or deportation
under the ‘crimes involving moral turpitude’ exclusion, and might be denied
citizenship under the ‘good moral character’ requirement”).
28. Minter, supra note 7, at 772-73, 783. But see Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432
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the United States Supreme Court held a Texas statute criminalizing
homosexual sodomy unconstitutional, explaining that the
government can not intervene to make private homosexual
29
conduct between consenting adults a crime. Since that decision,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has not proffered
guidance as to how it will treat individuals with sodomy convictions
for immigration purposes.
While lesbians and gay men are no longer statutorily barred
from entering the United States, immigration laws continue to
30
discriminatorily impact them in many ways. The discriminatory
impact of U.S. immigration laws against lesbians and gay men is
most prevalent in the arena of family immigration. Foreign
nationals currently cannot immigrate to the United States based on
their committed relationship with a U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident of the same sex.

(4th Cir. 1981) (holding private consensual homosexual acts in themselves do not
make one ineligible for naturalization for lack of “good moral character”).
29. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
30. U.S. immigration law disproportionately affects lesbian and gay foreign
nationals seeking entry into the United States. Foreign nationals that have
communicable diseases, such as HIV, are inadmissible or removable from the
United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000) (stating an alien “who is
determined . . . to have a communicable disease of public health significance,
which shall include infection with the etiologic agent for acquired immune
deficiency syndrome” is ineligible for a visa and may not enter the United States).
Existing waivers to exclusion and relief from removal can be granted to foreign
nationals if they can demonstrate that their opposite-sex spouse is a U.S. citizen or
lawful permanent resident. See id. § 1182 (g)(1)(A)(providing that the Attorney
General may waive application of subsection (a)(1)(A)(i) to an alien who is the
spouse of a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident, or alien with an immigrant
visa).
Similar bars to admission also have a disproportionate effect on
homosexuals, as the applicable waiver provisions do not apply to lesbian and gay
foreign nationals. These include the three and ten year bars to admission for
aliens that were unlawfully present in the United States: (i) for more than six
months, but less than one year who then departed the United States and
subsequently sought to re-enter or adjust their status (three year bar), or (ii) for
one year or more, then departed the United States and subsequently sought to reenter or adjust their status (ten year bar). See id. § 1182 (a)(9)(B)(i). Waivers to
the three and ten year bars are not available to lesbians and gay men because they
require a showing of proof that refusal to admit the foreign national “would result
in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawful[] resident [of an opposite-sex] spouse
or parent of such alien.” Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v). A foreign national does not
qualify for a waiver based on the extreme hardship suffered by a same-sex partner
that is a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident.
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III. THE EXCLUSION OF LESBIAN AND GAY BI-NATIONAL COUPLES
FROM FAMILY-SPONSORED IMMIGRATION TEARS APART AMERICAN
FAMILIES AND IS CONTRARY TO THE GROWING INTERNATIONAL
TREND TO RECOGNIZE SAME-SEX COUPLES FOR IMMIGRATION
PURPOSES
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), U.S.
citizens and lawful permanent residents may sponsor their spouses
31
for immigration purposes. The Immigration and Nationality Act
does not define the term “spouse,” but has historically been
32
interpreted to apply only to opposite-sex couples.
In 1996,
Congress clarified the meaning of “spouse” under the INA, and all
federal statutes, to refer only to a person of the opposite sex who is
a husband or a wife, thereby excluding recognition of same-sex
33
spouses. As a consequence, same-sex partners of U.S. citizens and
permanent residents are not considered “spouses” under
immigration law and their partners cannot sponsor them based on
34
their relationship for family-based immigration.
Current
immigration law forces many bi-national couples to separate,
relocate to another country, and/or live apart, maintaining
expensive
and
emotionally
challenging
long
distance
35
relationships.
31. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000)); id. § 203(a)(2) (codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1553(a)(2) (2000)).
32. In March 2003, William Yates of the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), issued a
memorandum instructing DHS officials about various aspects of marriage under
U.S. immigration law. Cyrus D. Mehta, Gay Marriage and Immigration, Mar. 15,
2004, available at http://cyrusmehta.com/news_cyrus.asp?news_id=964&intPage
=10. One small section of that memorandum addresses the issue of marriages
between same-sex couples and refers to the Defense of Marriage Act. Id. Yates
instructed that for a relationship to qualify as marriage for purposes of federal law,
including under the Immigration and Nationality Act, one partner must be a man
and the other a woman in a marriage. Id. In 1982, the Ninth Circuit considered
whether a citizen’s spouse must be of the opposite sex in order to fall within the
meaning of “spouse” under section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) and whether such a requirement would be constitutional. Adams v.
Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 1982). The court held that section
201(b) of the INA categorically excluded same-sex partners from its definition of
“spouse.” See id. at 1041 (holding Congress’s intent under the INA was that “only
partners in heterosexual marriages [can] be considered spouses under section
201(b)”). The decision was based, in part, on the court’s reasoning that Congress
could not have intended to include same-sex partners under the term “spouses”
because the INA also mandated the exclusion of homosexuals. Id. at 1040-41.
The court also reasoned that it was adopting the “ordinary, contemporary,
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Proposed U.S. legislation, the Uniting American Families
Act (UAFA), recognizes the right to family and family unity by
36
granting bi-national same-sex couples immigration benefits. The
UAFA would promote and protect the international right to family
unity for all families, and align the United States with eighteen
other countries that already recognize same-sex couples for
37
purposes of immigration.
A. The Defense of Marriage Act: The Legal Basis for Excluding Lesbian
and Gay Bi-National Couples from Family-Sponsored Immigration Benefits
The federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) clarified the
38
meaning of “spouse” under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Signed into law in 1996 by President Bill Clinton, DOMA creates a
federal definition of marriage to be applied in connection with all
39
federal statutes and programs. The federal definition of marriage
is the “legal union between one man and one woman as husband
40
and wife.” DOMA further clarifies that, for federal purposes, the
“word spouse refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
common meaning” of “spouse,” which at the time did not include spouses of the
same sex. Id. at 1040. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that the exclusion of
gay or lesbian spouses was constitutionally permissible. Id. at 1043. In
determining the constitutionality of the prohibition, the court noted its limited
power of judicial review over immigration procedures, stating that for immigration
purposes, “Congress has almost plenary power and may enact statutes which, if
applied to citizens, would be unconstitutional.” Id. at 1042.
33. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000)); id. § 2(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C
(2000)).
34. Id. § 3(a) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7); id. § 2(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1738C).
35. A preliminary study of the 2000 census by demographer Gary Gates of the
Williams Project on gay studies at the UCLA School of Law, found that in six
percent of the 594,391 same-sex unmarried couples, one of the partners is a
citizen and one is a noncitizen; that would indicate more than 35,000 same-sex binational couples living in the United States at the time of the census. GARY J.
GATES, BI-NATIONAL SAME-SEX UNMARRIED PARTNERS IN CENSUS 2000:A
DEMOGRAPHIC PORTRAIT 1 (2005), http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsproj/
publications/Binational_Report.pdf.
36. Uniting American Families Act, H.R. 3006, 109th Cong. (2005).
37. Those eighteen countries are: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Israel, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. See infra notes 61-76; see also GATES, supra note 35, at 2.
38. This publication will not address the legality of DOMA.
39. Defense of Marriage Act § 3 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000)).
40. Id.
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41

husband or a wife.” The effect of such language is to exclude all
same-sex couples from having a federally recognized marriage.
Under DOMA, this definition applies to any federal law or
regulation as well as to any interpretation of the various
42
administrative bureaus and agencies of the federal government.
By itself, DOMA precludes recognizing any spousal rights or
benefits, including immigration, for same-sex couples. Therefore,
unlike heterosexual spouses, lesbian and gay foreign nationals
cannot immigrate to the United States based on their relationship
with a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident of the same sex.
Only opposite-sex married persons may sponsor their foreign
43
national spouses for permanent resident status.
The immigration restriction against bi-national same-sex
partners remains true for bi-national same-sex couples whose
marriage is legally recognized by the state or foreign country in
which they wed. Because U.S. immigration benefits are federal
rights, only the federal government can confer legalization onto a
foreign national. Under DOMA, marriages, civil unions, and
domestic partnerships recognized by states confer no immigration
44
benefits to bi-national same-sex couples. Therefore, even though
marriages between same-sex couples are being legally performed in
other countries, as well as in the State of Massachusetts, such
recognition does not impact the current federal immigration law
and policy precluding lesbian and gay U.S. citizens or lawful
permanent residents from sponsoring their foreign national
partners for immigration benefits.
To date, DOMA has not been successfully challenged in the
45
context of immigration benefits or otherwise. Challenging the

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Mehta, supra note 32 (discussing the Yates memo).
44. See Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2419 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 1738C (2000) and 1 U.S.C. 7
(2000)).
45. See, e.g., Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 870, 880 (C.D.
Cal. 2005) (Finding section 3 of DOMA constitutional under the Due Process
Clause because the fundamental right to marriage does not include marriages
between two people of the same sex, and constitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause because the government’s interest in promoting procreation or
“stable relationships that facilitate rearing children” passes a rational basis test);
Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding DOMA
constitutional and dismissing complaint seeking declaratory judgment and
injunction against its enforcement); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 140-41 (Bankr.
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immigration treatment of same-sex couples in court is not currently
sanctioned by scholars and public interest groups. DOMA’s virtual
insulation of marriage between same-sex couples and any related
federal benefits, as well as the Supreme Court’s required deference
to Congress, makes litigation in immigration a disfavored option
for challenging the issue. Further, a negative decision at this point
would create a blockade for same-sex bi-national couples’
immigration efforts. A court challenge to DOMA is not the only
avenue for changing the treatment of bi-national same-sex couples
under immigration law. Currently, the best way to achieve
immigration equality for bi-national same-sex couples is to further
develop the ideas of family rights and unity for all U.S. citizens and
lawful residents while advocating for legislation that recognizes and
supports such rights.
B. The Uniting American Families Act Would Provide Same-Sex BiNational Couples with Equal Immigration Rights to Opposite Sex BiNational Couples
The Uniting American Families Act (formerly Permanent
Partners Immigration Act (PPIA)) is a bill currently before
Congress that provides same-sex couples with the same
46
immigration benefits as opposite-sex couples.
Specifically, the
UAFA would grant U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents the
right to sponsor their same-sex permanent partners to immigrate to
47
the United States.
This legislation would ease the current
immigration inequality and injustice endured by thousands of binational same-sex couples by granting immigration rights and
benefits to same-sex couples. It would not alter the federal
definition of spouse or provide same-sex couples with the federal

W.D. Wash. 2004) (finding DOMA constitutional and dismissing debtors’—two
women married in British Columbia, Canada—joint petition in bankruptcy); see
also Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (citing DOMA
and equivalent Florida law that homosexuals cannot marry and are thus relevantly
dissimilar to nonmarried heterosexuals for the purposes of a rational basis test as
applied to a Florida statute prohibiting adoption of children by homosexuals),
aff’d sub nom. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804
(11th Cir. 2004), reh’g denied 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004).
46. Uniting American Families Act, S. 1278, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3006,
109th Cong. (2005).
47. Uniting American Families Act, S. 1278, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3006,
109th Cong. (2005).
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48

rights and responsibilities of marriage. While the UAFA does not
cure the effects and reach of the Defense of Marriage Act, it will
advance family unity and end the forced separation and constant
fear of deportation faced by thousands of lesbian and gay couples
in the United States.
Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) first introduced this
bill, then known as the Permanent Partners Immigration Act, to
49
Congress in 2001. In July 2003, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
50
introduced the Senate companion bill for the first time. By the
end of the 108th Congress, the PPIA had garnered 129 co-sponsors
51
in the House and 12 co-sponsors in the Senate. On June 21, 2005,
the bill was re-introduced in both chambers of Congress under the
52
new name, the Uniting American Families Act. If passed, the
UAFA would allow U.S. citizens and permanent residents to file a
visa petition on behalf of their foreign national same-sex
permanent partners, allowing them to immigrate to the U.S. and
53
adjust their status to become lawful permanent residents. The bill
defines “permanent partner” as any person eighteen years of age or
older who is:
(i)
in a committed, intimate relationship with
an adult U.S. citizen or legal permanent
resident eighteen years of age or older in
which both parties intend a lifelong
commitment;

48. See Uniting American Families Act, S. 1278, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.
3006, 109th Cong. (2005) (inserting “permanent partners” after the term
“spouses” at many points throughout the Immigration and Nationality Act).
49. Bill Summary and Status, H.R. 690, 107th Cong. (2001),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR00690:@@@L&summ2=m&.
50. Bill Summary and Status, S. 1510, 108th Cong. (2003),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:SN01510:@@@L&summ2=m&.
51. Id.; Bill Summary and Status, H.R. 832, 108th Cong. (2003),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR00832:@@@L&summ2=m&.
52. Bill Summary and Status, S. 1278, 109th Cong. (2005),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:s.01278:; Bill Summary and
Status, H.R. 3006, 109th Cong. (2005), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d109:h.r.03006:.
53. See S. 1278, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005), which would amend 8 U.S.C. §
1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000) to include “permanent partners” as “immediate relatives”
of U.S. citizens not subject to numerical limitations or worldwide limitations, thus
allowing U.S. citizens to file a petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (a)(1)(A)(i)). See also
id. § 5 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) to give “permanent partners” and spouses of
permanent residents the same preference allocation, allowing permanent
residents to file a petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (a)(1)(B)(i)).
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(ii)

financially interdependent with that other
person;
(iii)
not married to, or in a permanent
partnership with, anyone other than that
other person;
(iv)
unable to contract with that person a
marriage
cognizable
under
the
Immigration and Nationality Act; and
(v)
is not a first, second, or third degree blood
54
relation of that other individual.
The permanent partners could prove that they have a bona
fide relationship through documentary and testimonial evidence.
The sponsoring “permanent partner” would also have to commit to
providing financial support before the other partner could obtain
55
immigration benefits based on their relationship.
These requirements ensure that the UAFA protects samesex couples in committed relationships while preventing fraudulent
immigration applications. Indeed, the applicable burden of proof
standard would be identical to that which currently applies to all
heterosexual married couples seeking immigration benefits.
Moreover, just like heterosexual couples, permanent partners
would be subject to severe criminal penalties for immigration fraud
or other abuse in connection with the application for permanent
56
residence.
Because the Act’s intent is to remedy the unequal
treatment of same-sex partners, it would not affect unmarried
heterosexual couples, who currently have the option to marry and
57
seek relief under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
The UAFA is analogous to immigration equality legislation
58
and policy adopted by Australia and Israel. It does not alter or
redefine the federal definition of marriage for immigration
purposes or otherwise. Nor does it provide additional legal rights
and responsibilities comparable to those afforded through
marriage. Instead, it simply provides U.S. citizens and lawful
permanent residents with the right to petition for their foreign

54. S. 1278, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
55. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii),
1183a(f).
56. See, e.g., S. 1278 § 18 (amending 8 U.S.C. 1325(c) to include permanent
partners in the marriage fraud provision).
57. See id. § 2(51)(D).
58. See infra Part III.C and note 65.
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national permanent partners to immigrate to the United States, a
right provided heterosexual bi-national couples. The right to
petition for one’s foreign national permanent partner would
provide for family unity and strengthen familial bonds. Partners
unable to reside together are forced to separate, relocate to
another country, and/or maintain expensive and emotionally
challenging long distance relationships. As recognized by Lawrence,
lesbians and gay men have the right to form and sustain loving
59
personal relationships. Geographical unity is an essential element
to sustain such relationships.
At the time of this publication, ten Senate members and
60
ninety-one Representatives co-sponsor the bill.

59. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
60. Sen. Boxer, Barbara (CA); Sen. Chafee, Lincoln (RI); Sen. Corzine, Jon S.
(NJ); Sen. Dayton, Mark (MN); Sen. Feingold, Russell D. (WI); Sen. Jeffords,
James M. (VT); Sen. Kennedy, Edward M. (MA); Sen. Kerry, John F. (MA); Sen.
Lautenberg, Frank R. (NJ); Sen. Murray, Patty (WA); Rep. Abercrombie, Neil (HI1); Rep. Allen, Thomas H. (ME-1); Rep. Andrews, Robert E. (NJ-1); Rep. Baird,
Brian(WA-3); Rep. Baldwin, Tammy (WI-2); Rep. Berkley, Shelley (NV-1); Rep.
Berman, Howard L. (CA-28); Rep. Blumenauer, Earl (OR-3); Rep. Brown,
Corrine(FL-3); Rep. Brown, Sherrod (OH-13); Rep. Capps, Lois (CA-23); Rep.
Capuano, Michael E. (MA-8); Rep. Clay, William Lacy (MO-1); Rep. Crowley,
Joseph (NY-7); Rep. Davis, Susan A. (CA-53); Rep. DeGette, Diana (CO-1); Rep.
Delahunt, William D. (MA-10); Rep. DeLauro, Rosa L. (CT-3); Rep. Emanuel,
Rahm (IL-5); Rep. Engel, Eliot L. (NY-17); Rep. Eshoo, Anna G.(CA-14); Rep.
Farr, Sam (CA-17); Rep. Fattah, Chaka (PA-2); Rep. Filner, Bob (CA-51); Rep.
Frank, Barney (MA-4); Rep. Gonzalez, Charles A. (TX-20); Rep. Grijalva, Raul M.
(AZ-7); Rep. Gutierrez, Luis V. (IL-4); Rep. Harman, Jane (CA-36); Rep. Hastings,
Alcee L. (FL-23); Rep. Hinchey, Maurice D. (NY-22); Rep. Holt, Rush D. (NJ-12);
Rep. Honda, Michael M. (CA-15); Rep. Hoyer, Steny H. (MD-5); Rep. Inslee, Jay
(WA-1); Rep. Jackson, Jesse L., Jr. (IL-2); Rep. Jones, Stephanie Tubbs (OH-11);
Rep. Kennedy, Patrick J. (RI-1); Rep. Kolbe, Jim (AZ-8); Rep. Kucinich, Dennis J.
(OH-10); Rep. Langevin, James R. (RI-2); Rep. Lantos, Tom (CA-12); Rep. Larson,
John B. (CT-1); Rep. Lee, Barbara (CA-9); Rep. Levin, Sander M. (MI-12); Rep.
Lewis, John (GA-5); Rep. Lofgren, Zoe (CA-16); Rep. Lowey, Nita M. (NY-18);
Rep. Markey, Edward J. (MA-7); Rep. Matusi, Doris O. (CA-5); Rep. McCarthy,
Carolyn (NY-4); Rep. McCollum, Betty (MN-4); Rep. McDermott, Jim (WA-7);
Rep. McNulty, Michael R. (NY-21); Rep. Meek, Kendrick B. (FL-17); Rep.
Menendez, Robert (NJ-13); Rep. Michaud, Michael H. (ME-2); Rep. Miller, Brad
(NC-13); Rep. Miller, George (CA-7); Rep. Moore, Dennis (KS-3); Rep. Moore,
Gwen (WI-4); Rep. Moran, James P. (VA-8); Rep. Napolitano, Grace F. (CA-38);
Rep. Neal, Richard E. (MA-2); Rep. Olver, John W. (MA-1); Rep. Owens, Major R.
(NY-11); Rep. Pallone, Frank, Jr. (NJ-6); Rep. Pastor, Ed (AZ-4); Rep. Payne,
Donald M. (NJ-10); Rep. Pelosi, Nancy (CA-8); Rep. Rangel, Charles B. (NY-15);
Rep. Rothman, Steven R. (NJ-9); Rep. Sabo, Martin Olav (MN-5); Rep. Sanchez,
Linda T. (CA-39); Rep. Sanders, Bernard (VT); Rep. Schakowsky, Janice D. (IL-9);
Rep. Schiff, Adam B. (CA-29); Rep. Serrano, José E. (NY-16); Rep. Sherman, Brad
(CA-27); Rep. Simmons, Rob (CT-2); Rep. Smith, Adam (WA-9); Rep. Solis, Hilda
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C. The United States Should Heed Legislation of Eighteen Countries
World-Wide that Have Granted Immigration Equality
Currently eighteen countries around the world recognize
same-sex couples for immigration purposes, generally through
61
marriages, registered domestic partnerships, or civil unions. The
U.S. government’s failure to provide same-sex bi-national couples
with equal access to immigration rights provided opposite-sex
couples is contrary to the growing acknowledgment of same-sex
relationships reflected in western democracies’ immigration laws
and policy. The absence of immigration equality undercuts family
security and democratic ideals endorsed by U.S. politic.
Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, South Africa, and Spain
recognize marriages between same-sex partners and thereby
provide immigration rights and benefits to bi-national same-sex
62
spouses. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the

L. (CA-32); Rep. Stark, Fortney Pete (CA-13); Rep. Tierney, John F. (MA-6); Rep.
Wasserman Schultz, Debbie (FL-20); Rep. Watson, Diane E. (CA-33); Rep.
Waxman, Henry A. (CA-30); Rep. Weiner, Anthony D. (NY-9); Rep. Wexler,
Robert (FL-19); Rep. Woolsey, Lynn C. (CA-6); Rep. Wu, David (OR-1). See
Immigration
Equality,
Information
on
Current
Co-Sponsors,
http://www.immigrationequality.org/template.php?pageid=152 (listing current
co-sponsors of UAFA) (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).
61. Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Iceland, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, and theUnited Kingdom have reformed their immigration policies
and/or enacted additional legislation to allow gay and lesbian citizens to sponsor
their same-sex partners for immigration purposes. See Partners Task Force for Gay
& Lesbian Couples, Immigration Roundup: A Survey of Welcoming Countries, Aug. 16,
2005, http://www.eskimo.com/~demian/immigr.html; infra notes 62-76.
62. Belgium offers legal marriage for same-sex couples. Partners Task Force
for Gay & Lesbian Couples, supra note 61. “Originally, it was offered only if they
are both Belgium citizens, or come from a country that allows legal marriage.” Id.
The text of the Belgian law opening civil marriage to same-sex couples is available
in Flemish and French. See Projet de Loi Ouvrant le Mariage à des Personnes de
Même Sexe et Modifiant Certaines Dispositions du Code Civil [Law Project
Opening Marriage to Same-Sex Persons and Modifying Certain Provisions of the
Civil Code], Doc. 50 2165/ (2002/2003) (2003), http://www.dekamer.be/FLWB
/pdf/50/2165/50K2165003. pdf.
Canada initially permitted foreign same-sex partners to apply for
residency under the humanitarian and compassionate grounds exception, but now
simply includes same-sex couples in its “family” immigration category. See
Citizenship
and
Immigration
Canada,
Family
Class
Immigration,
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/sponsor/index.html (last updated Sept. 27, 2005).
The foreign partner of a Dutch National, or of an EU citizen resident in
the Netherlands, or of a foreign national granted refugee status in the
Netherlands, may settle in the Netherlands. Dutch Ministry of Justice, IND
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United Kingdom have all passed legislation allowing same-sex
couples to become registered partners and/or enter into civil
unions, enjoying most of the rights and benefits of marriage,
63
including immigration benefits. France, Germany, and Portugal

Residence Wizard, http://www.ind.nl/EN/verblijfwijzer/ (last visited on Dec. 5,
2005) (offering information for those who wish to enter the Netherlands).
In December 2005, in the case of Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, the
Constitutional Court of South Africa ruled unanimously that it was
unconstitutional to prevent people of the same gender marrying when marriage
was permitted for people of opposite genders.
CCT 60/04, available at
http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/glrts/mhafourie120105.pdf. The court held
that the Marriage Act 25 of 1961, insofar as it did not allow marriage between
same-sex partners, was inconsistent with the constitution, but suspended the
declaration of its invalidity for twelve months from the date of judgment so as “to
allow Parliament to correct the defects.” Id. The court further held that should
Parliament not correct the defects by then, the Marriage Act would then be read
so as to allow same-sex partners to marry. Id. Since 1999, following a national
court ruling that addressed the issue of immigration equality, South Africa has
provided citizens with the right to sponsor their same-sex partners for immigration
benefits. Hazeldean & Betz, supra note 4, at 18. The South African decision
unanimously held that failing to treat same-sex life partners equally was a violation
of the South African Constitution’s equality clause. Id.; see also Nat’l Coalition for
Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Home Affairs, 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC) at 69
(S. Afr.). “Previously, the South African government granted immigration benefits
only in heterosexual marriage relationships.” Hazeldean & Betz, supra note 4, at
18.
Spain recognized marriages between same-sex couples in a law that took
effect on July 3, 2005. See Daniel Woolis, Spain’s Gay Marriage Law Goes into Effect,
365GAY.COM, July 2, 2005, http://www.365gay.com/newscon05/07/070205
spain.htm. Since then, one court in Catalonia has denied a bi-national couple
(one Spanish partner, one Indian partner) a marriage license based on an article
in the Spanish civil code that foreign nationals seeking to marry must follow the
laws of their country of citizenship. Daniel Woolis, Spain’s Gay Marriage Law Hits
Snag Over Foreigners, 365GAY.COM, July 6, 2005, http://www.365gay.com
/newscon05/07/0706705 spain.htm. However, other bi-national couples have
successfully wed in Spain and received the attendant immigration rights granted to
married couples. See Tito Drago, Matrimonio gay se internacionaliza [Gay Marriage is
Internationalized],
INTER
PRESS
SERVICE
NEWS
AGENCY
(2005),
http://www.ipsnoticias. net/nota.asp?idnews=34585. Finally, on the week before
August 10, 2005, Spain’s justice ministry overturned the unfavorable ruling in
Catalonia, and ruled that there are no such restrictions on marriages between
same-sex bi-national couples in Spain. See Spain Opens Door to Foreign Gay Marriages,
365GAY.COM, Aug. 10, 2005, http://www.365gay.com/newscon05/08/081005
spain.htm. Information about applying for a Visa de Reagrupación Familiar or
Schengen visa (for family reunification) is available at the Spanish Consulate. See,
e.g., Consulate General of Spain in New York, Residence Visa to Reunite a Family
with a Spaniard or a Citizen of the European Union, http://www.spain
consulny.org/%21consula.doi/!reagrupsp.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2005).
63. Denmark’s domestic partnership law of 1989, amended in 1999, provides
registered partners all the rights associated with marriage, including immigration,
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where one of the partners is Danish. “Foreign nationals can obtain a residence
permit in Denmark if they have a spouse, cohabiting companion or registered
partner already resident in Denmark.” See Danish Immigration Service, Spouses
and
Cohabitating
Companions,
http://www.udlst.dk/english/Family+
Reunification/Spouses/Default.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2005); see also Danish
Immigration Service, Legislation and Conventions, http://www.udlst.dk/english/
Legislation/Default.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2005) (displaying links to an English
translation of the Aliens Act).
In Finland, “[p]ersons of the same sex who have registered their
partnership are considered spouses” for purposes of immigration. Finland
Directorate of Immigration, Family Members of Finnish Citizens and Others than
EU Citizens and Equivalent Persons, http://www.uvi.fi/netcomm/content.
asp?path= 8,2472,2491&language=EN (last visited Dec. 6, 2005). “A cohabitant
can be granted a residence permit if the cohabitants have lived together for at
least two years and can prove the cohabitation by presenting a lease agreement or
other documentation or if the cohabitants have joint custody of a child, it is not
required that the spouses have lived together for two years.” Id.
Under Iceland’s Registered Partnership Law 1996, bi-national lesbian and
gay couples have the same rights of residence as bi-national married couples,
where one is an Icelandic national. See Icelandic Directorate of Immigration, E –
Residence Permit for Family Members, http://www.utl.is/index.php?bId=202 (last
visited Dec. 6, 2005).
Under Norway’s Registered Partnership Law, bi-national lesbian and gay
couples have the same rights of residence as bi-national married couples when one
is a Norwegian national. See Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, Family
Reunification, http://www.udi.no/templates/Page.aspx?id=4665 (last visited Jan.
12, 2006).
In 1972, the Swedish Immigration Board adopted the same rules for
same-sex partners as for heterosexual domestic partners in cases where applicants
referred to family connection as a reason for immigrating to Sweden. SWEDISH
MIGRATION BOARD, FACTS ABOUT RESIDENCE PERMIT ON THE GROUNDS OF FAMILY TIES
(2005), http://www.migrationsverket.se/infomaterial/bob/sokande/familj/utfam
_en.pdf. The first actual residence permit to be granted under this decision came
in the mid-1970s. Id. Bi-national couples in a Registered Partnership enjoy the
same treatment as opposite-sex married couples when one partner is a Swedish
national. Id. Sweden’s 1995 partnership law gives registered partners the same
legal rights as heterosexual marriages. Id.
The United Kingdom’s Civil Partnership Act, which came into effect on
December 5, 2005, “affords same-sex couples almost all the same benefits as
heterosexual married couples.” Civil Unions begin in UK, WORKPERMIT.COM, Dec.
16, 2005, http://www.ukimmigration.com/news/2005_12_16/uk/civil_unions_
begin.htm.
The legal status allows recognition of same-sex partners for
immigration and nationality purposes. Id. “Civil partners gain rights to survivor
pensions[,] hospital visitation, and equal treatment for tax purposes. They will be
exempt, as married couples are, from testifying against each other in court. They
will also be deemed stepparents of each others’ children, and able to formally
adopt.” Id. Prior to the Civil Partnership Act, a same-sex partner of a British
citizen, European Union national or permanent resident of the U.K. could be
granted permission to remain in the U.K. Immigration Rules, pt. 8, § 1, ¶ 295A
(U.K.),
available
at
http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/en/home/
lawspolicy/immigration_rules/part_8/part_9.html.
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have created alternative partnership schemes which provide a
limited number of legal rights to same-sex partners, including the
64
right to petition one’s same-sex partner for immigration benefits.
Australia and Israel have reformed their immigration policies to
recognize same-sex couples without granting the right to marry or
65
creating an alternative partnership scheme.
Brazil provided citizens with the right to sponsor their samesex partners for immigration benefits following national court

64. “France grants gay and lesbian couples immigration rights through a less
comprehensive partnership scheme called the Pacte Civil de Solidarite (PACS).
The PACS is open to opposite-sex couples as well as same-sex couples and is not
intended to be parallel to marriage; it does not change a person’s civil status from
single to married, nor is a formal proceeding similar to a divorce required to
terminate the relationship. It does, however, confer immigration rights.”
Hazeldean & Betz, supra note 4, at 17.
“Germany passed a Registered Life Partnership Law in November 2000,
[creating Lebenspartnerschaft, or “Life Partnership,”] which grants participating
same-sex couples a limited number of legal rights including inheritance, tenancy,
and immigration.” Id. at 17-18. Prior to the passage of Germany’s partnership
scheme, a number of same-sex couples managed to obtain residence permits for
the foreign partner by invoking the ruling of the Higher Administrative Court in
Munster. See generally Stephen Ross Levitt, New Legislation in Germany Concerning
Same-Sex Unions, 7 ILSA J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 469 (2001) (providing an extensive
description of Germany’s history of same-sex legislation and recent legislative
developments). The Munster court, which has sole jurisdiction in Germany in
appeals regarding visa matters, ruled that the European Convention on Human
Rights implied a right for the foreign partner of a bi-national same-sex couple in a
lasting relationship to be granted a residence permit. Id. The German Foreign
Ministry appealed this ruling but then allowed the time-limit for the written
submission of the appeal to expire so that the ruling became legally valid. Id.
Before the Registered Life Partnership Law became enacted, each region
individually dealt with the issue of same-sex partner immigration. Id.
“Portugal passed a . . . statute in March 2001, creating an institution
called a registered union that grants same-sex couples a limited number of rights,
including the ability to sponsor a foreign partner for immigration.” Hazeldean &
Betz, supra note 4, at 18.
65. In Australia, same-sex partners of Australian citizens, permanent
residents, or eligible New Zealand citizens gain permanent residence to Australia
under the Interdependency class of available relationships. See Australian Gov’t,
Dep’t of Immigr. & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Fact Sheet 30: Family
Stream Migration—Partners, http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/30partners.htm (last
visited Jan. 12, 2006).
Since 1994, in the form of common law marriage, Israel has granted
unregistered cohabitation for same-sex couples. Civil Unions in Israel, WIKIPEDIA,
THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_unions_in_Israel (last
visited Jan. 6, 2006). Prior to 1994, common law marriage was only extended to
heterosexual couples. Id. Following lawsuits in 1994-1996, same-sex couples enjoy
several benefits. Id.
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rulings that addressed the issue of immigration equality. In 2003,
a Brazilian court held that same-sex unions entered into abroad
67
must be recognized for purposes of immigration in Brazil. This
ruling enables bi-national couples who enter into marriage, a civil
union, or domestic partnership, to utilize Brazilian immigration
68
procedures associated with sponsoring a spouse. Although slow to
implement national adherence to the decision, the Brazilian
government eventually “dispose[d] of the criteria for the
concession of temporary or permanent visa, or of definitive
permanence to the male or female partner, without distinction of
69
sex.” The Brazilian National Council on Immigration currently
70
recognizes same-sex bi-national couples for immigration purposes.
Since March 29, 1999, New Zealand’s immigration law has
allowed for same-sex partners of New Zealand citizens or residents
to apply for residence in New Zealand in the same manner as
71
different-sex spouses or partners. Prior to this alignment, samesex couples were able to immigrate although serious constraints
applied against them that were not applicable to similarly situated
72
heterosexual couples. For instance, “same sex couples ha[d] to
66. Hazeldean & Betz, supra note 4, at 18.
67. Press Release, Immigration Equality, Brazil Clarifies its Same-Sex
Immigration Policy (May 11, 2005), http://www.lgirtf.org/uploadedfiles/Brazil
clarifies same-sex immigration policy.pdf [hereinafter Brazil 2005 Press Release];
see also Press Release, Love Sees No Borders, Brazil Beats U.S. in Providing
Immigration
Equality
to
Same-Sex
Couples
(Dec.
18,
2003),
http://www.loveseesnoborders.org/Rel_121803.html.
68. Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, Immigration Roundup: A
Survey of Welcoming Countries, Aug. 16, 2005, http://www.eskimo.com/~demian
/immigr.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).
69. Press Release, Brazilian Rainbow Group, Brazil Clarifies Its Same-Sex
Immigration Policy, (May 11, 2004), http://www.brgny.org/Press.html (quoting
Brazil’s National Immigration Council’s Administrative Resolution Number 3 of
December 3, 2003); Brazil 2005 Press Release, supra note 67.
70. Brazil 2005 Press Release, supra note 67; Love Sees No Borders, supra note
67.
71. Hazeldean & Betz, supra note 4 at 18. In 2004, New Zealand passed a civil
union law that took effect in April 2005; the immigration laws applicable to binational same-sex couples are unaffected by the civil union law. See Internal Affairs
Prepares for Civil Unions, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Dec. 10, 2004, available at
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/ story.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=9002623; see also
The New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs, Services, Civil Union,
http://www.bdm.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Services-Births-Deaths-andMarriages-Civil-Union?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 16, 2006) (describing the
Civil Union Act 2004).
72. Media Statement, Hon Tuariki John Delamere, N.Z. Minister of
Immigration, Immigration, Discrimination and Same-Sex de Facto Couples (Dec.
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show their relationship [was] at least of four years duration before
it [would be] recognized [sic] for the purposes of residence
eligibility, whereas de facto heterosexual couples ha[d] to show
73
they’ve been together for only two years.”
In expanding its
immigration law and policy to include same-sex couples, the New
Zealand government relied upon the New Zealand Human Rights
Act of 1993 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
74
orientation. Moreover, since 2001, “partners of student or work
visa or permit holders may be issued with temporary visas or
granted temporary permits of a type appropriate to their needs for
75
the currency of their partner’s visa or permit.”
On February 11, 2003, [the European Parliament of the
European Union] approved a directive guaranteeing
same-sex couples freedom of movement among member
states equal to that of married heterosexual couples,
where those same-sex relationships are recognized.
Justification for the legislation was unambiguous: the
European Union declared it must “reflect and respect the
diversity of family relationships that exist in today’s
76
society” by including same-sex couples.
All eighteen countries have adopted varying legal bases for
recognizing bi-national same-sex couples for immigration purposes.
Behind each approach, however, is the inherent recognition by
these countries’ politic that such legislation and policy furthers the
right to family and the importance of family unity, regardless of
sexual orientation. Absence of similar U.S. legislation abrogates
our obligation under international law to promote and protect

22, 1998), available at http://www.gaylawnet.com/news/1998/im98.htm.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also Immigration New Zealand, Partner, http://www.immigration.
govt.nz/migrant/stream/live/partner/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2006) (offering
information regarding immigration policies in New Zealand); NEW ZEALAND
IMMIGRATION SERVICE, OPERATIONS MANUAL § F3.10 (2001) (setting out evidentiary
requirements for living in a “genuine and stable” relationship), available at
http://www.immigration.govt.nz/nzis/operations_manual/5538.htm (last visited
Jan. 6, 2005).
75. Compare NEW ZEALAND IMMIGRATION SERVICE, OPERATIONS MANUAL § E4.5a
(2001),
available
at
http://www.immigration.govt.nz/nzis/operations
manual/5089.htm, with NEW ZEALAND IMMIGRATION SERVICE, OPERATIONS MANUAL §
E4.5a (2003), available at http://www.immigration.govt.nz/nzis/operations
_manual/6161.htm, and NEW ZEALAND IMMIGRATION SERVICE, OPERATIONS MANUAL
§ E4.5a (2005), available at http://www.immigration.govt.nz/nzis/operations
manual/990.htm#o7611.
76. Hazeldean & Betz, supra note 4, at 18.
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family unity.
In adopting the UAFA, Congress will be
strengthening the right to family and family unity for gay and
lesbian U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents as well as their
children.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN
LAWRENCE SUPPORT EXTENDING IMMIGRATION BENEFITS TO SAMESEX COUPLES
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence relied heavily upon
international norms to strike down a Texas state anti-sodomy law.
In so doing, the Court affirmed the right to form and sustain loving
personal relationships, regardless of the partners’ genders, and to
lead private lives free of government restriction and legal
condemnation. Current immigration law acts to restrict the right
of bi-national same-sex couples to sustain loving personal
relationships. Many bi-national same-sex couples are forced by law
to separate because the U.S. citizen or lawful resident cannot
sponsor his or her foreign-national partner for immigration
benefits. Such reality is contrary to the internationally recognized
right to family and family unity as well as the liberty right
recognized by Lawrence.
In adopting non-discriminatory
immigration legislation and policy, eighteen countries have
recognized the importance of family unity to same-sex couples. By
passing the UAFA, Congress will further comply with its obligations
under international law to protect the right to family and family
unity. Moreover, Congress will further the liberty interest of samesex couples, recognized by Lawrence, to form and sustain loving
personal relationships without the governmental intrusion of
forced separation.
A. The International Right to Family and Family Unity and Its
Application to Immigration Law and Policy
There is broad international consensus on the importance of
the family. International human rights law protects the right to
family life. As one court has noted, “[t]he essence of family life is
78
the right to live together.” Moreover, a variety of different treaty
provisions suggest that current international law contains norms

77.
78.

See infra Part IV.
Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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79

against involuntary family separation.
The protection of the
international right to family life and unity is of particular relevance
to foreign nationals, both in matters of entry and deportation, as
well as in the conditions of residence. Immigration equality is
necessary to protect the families and family unity of same-sex
couples.
1. International Law Mandates that the United States Protect the
Right to Family Life and Family Unity
International treaty law renders a duty upon State Parties to
80
uphold the provisions set forth within a given treaty instrument.
States become Party to an international treaty upon signature and
ratification of the instrument. Upon such ratification, State Parties
are obliged to implement national legislation consistent with the
duties and obligations to which the treaty alludes. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal Declaration”); the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the
Convention on the Rights of the Child; and three regional human
rights conventions for Europe, the Americas, and Africa entered
into force in 1953, 1978, and 1986, respectively, all contain specific
provisions affecting families and have implications for the
development of an international norm against involuntary family
separation.
The international right to family integrity is an aspect of the
right to privacy, which is protected by a number of international
conventions. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to attacks
upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the
81
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”
Similar language focusing on a standard of arbitrariness is found in
82
Article 17 of the ICCPR, Article 11 of the American Convention
79. See infra text accompanying notes 88-97.
80. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is
part of our law . . . .”).
81. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 12, G.A. Res. 217(A)(III),
U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
82. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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on Human Rights (“American Convention”), Article 16 of the
84
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Article 10 of the
85
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Article 8
of the European Convention on Human Rights (“European
Convention”) provides similar protection in that “[e]veryone has
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
86
correspondence.”
Instead of using the term “arbitrary,” the
European Convention spells out the conditions under which the
State may interfere with family life:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
87
others.
Various treaty provisions also “seek to protect the family unit,
as opposed to the rights of individuals to remain with their families.
These provisions focus on the family as an institution and its
88
relationship to society as a whole.” For instance, Article 16(3) of
the Universal Declaration states: “The family is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by
89
90
society and the State.” Article 23(1) of the ICCPR and Article
91
17(1) of the American Convention contain identical language to
that contained within the Universal Declaration. “Implicit in this
right is the right of family members to live together,” according to

83. American Convention on Human Rights art. 11, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
84. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 16, adopted Nov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
85. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, July 11, 1990,
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999).
86. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Council of Europe, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 230.
87. Id. art. 8(2); see also Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a
Violation of International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213, 220 (2003) (listing
treaties that address the subject and noting, “arbitrariness is the touchstone for
what counts as unlawful interference with the family”).
88. Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 87, at 228.
89. UDHR, supra note 81, art. 16(3), at 71.
90. ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 23(1).
91. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 83, art. 17(1).
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one American court’s interpretation of the ICCPR. To protect the
fundamental right of families to live together, the ICCPR provides
that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
93
with his . . . family . . . .” The Preamble to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child similarly describes the family as the
94
“fundamental group of society.” Protections for family life are
also espoused in the International Covenant on Economic, Social
95
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Article 18 of the African Charter
on Human and People’s Rights goes into further detail regarding
the family’s cultural role and the State’s obligations:
1. The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society.
It shall be protected by the State which shall take care of
its physical health and morals.
2. The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is
the custodian of morals and traditional values recognized
96
by the community.
These treaties explicitly promote and protect the rights to family
life and family unity. The United States, being a State Party to the
ICCPR and the American Convention, has a duty under
international treaty law to implement national legislation consistent
with the duties and obligations alluded to within these instruments,
97
including the right to family and family unity.
92. Taveras-Lopez v. Reno, 127 F. Supp. 2d 598, 608 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (citing
ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 23(1)).
93. ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 17(1).
94. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 84.
95. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 10(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3,
1976) (“The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the
family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for
its establishment and [because] it is responsible for the care and education of
dependent children.”).
96. African Charter on Human and People’s Rights art. 18(1), (2), June 27,
1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force
Oct. 21, 1986).
97. “[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations, if any other possible construction remains . . . .” Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 887 n.20 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6
U.S. 64, 67 (1804), quoted in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953)); see also,
e.g., RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS,
PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 159, 160, 272 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing the
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988), which gives district courts original
jurisdiction of actions by aliens for torts “committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States”); cf. Judicial Conference, Second Circuit,
170 F.R.D. 201, 312-18 (1997) (public debate by members of the Court of Appeals,
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Furthermore, as a member of the United Nations, the United
States has a duty to respect the principles set forth in the United
Nations Charter. The U.N. Charter is a treaty which binds member
98
states of the United Nations. The U.N. Charter reads, in relevant
part, that the purpose of the United Nations is to promote and
99
encourage respect for human rights. While the U.N. Charter fails
to define what human rights are, such rights may be defined by
reference to the various human rights conventions subsequently
adopted by the United Nations, known as the International Bill of
100
Human Rights.
The Universal Declaration and the ICCPR,
instruments included within the International Bill of Human
Rights, recognize the international right to family. The rights
contained within the International Bill of Human Rights are
incorporated into the larger definition of human rights under the
U.N. Charter that should be adhered to by the United States.
Lastly, the United States may have a duty under customary
international law to protect and preserve the right to family and
family unity as recognized by the Universal Declaration and ICCPR.
Customary international law, which is comprised of the customs
and usages among nations of the world, is part of the law of the
101
United States.
The United States applies the international
customary law of human rights, which is part of the greater body of
102
law. Treaty law can be evidence of customary international law in

Second Circuit on the effect of treaties and human rights law on the internal law
of the United States).
98. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2 (“All Members, in order to ensure to all of
them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith
the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.”).
99. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
100. The International Bill of Human Rights incorporates the following
instruments: Universal Declaration of Human Rights; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights; Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty. Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1), the
International Bill of Human Rights, June 1996, http://www.unhchr.ch/
html/menu6/2/fs2.htm.
101. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731, 735 (2004) (reviewing a
claim that the principles of a treaty not enforceable in federal courts had “attained
the status of binding customary international law”); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677, 700 (1900).
102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 701 cmt. e (1987).
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103

that treaties tend to reflect customary norms.
When a treaty
codifies customary international law, the provisions that originated
as customary law remain binding on all states, while any new
104
provisions bind only the states that ratify the treaty.
The
provisions within the ICCPR and Universal Declaration of Human
105
Rights reflect customary international law. As such, the rights to
be free from arbitrary interference with family life and from
arbitrary expulsion are human rights that are part of customary
international law that the United States must respect.
2. The Application of the International Right to Family Life and
Family Unity to Countries’ Immigration Laws and Policy
Some of the most frequent instances of family separation
occur in the context of immigration and anti-immigration
106
policies.
Traditionally, international law has recognized a
sovereign right by states to exclude and deport aliens under its
107
domestic immigration laws.
This right, however, is limited by
countervailing provisions of international law, including the right
that deportees be provided with various procedural protections,
have individualized deportation proceedings, and not be removed
108
if they can demonstrate eligibility for asylum or refugee status.
“No specific human rights treaty provision bans separation of
109
families through deportation.”
The deportation of foreign
nationals may nevertheless violate various human rights treaties,
specifically the treaty provisions which recognize the international
right to family and family unity. For example, the U.N. Human

103. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 345
(1991); Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge
of Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT’L L. 211, 222 (1991).
104. Gunning, supra note 103, at 213.
105. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217(III)(A)
(Dec. 10, 1948), as a source of customary international law).
106. See Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 87, at 213. Other instances include wars
and refugee crises, intra-cultural conflicts, and “changing conceptions of what
constitutes a family.” Id. at 278, 287.
107. See id. at 266.
108. Id.; see also Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 233-34 (E.D.N.Y. 1999),
abrogated on other grounds by Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2004); Louis
Henkin, Evolving Concepts of International Human Rights Law and the Current
Consensus, Speech before the Judicial Conference for the Second Circuit (June
15, 1996) in 170 F.R.D. 201, 275-76 (1997).
109. See Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 87, at 262.
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Rights Committee has recognized that deportation can interfere
110
The
with family life in violation of Article 23(1) of the ICCPR.
ICCPR prevents a nation from separating families in a manner that,
while in accordance with national law, is nonetheless unreasonable
and in conflict with the treaty provisions which specify that
interference with family shall be “unlawful” and shall not be
111
“arbitrary.”
Similarly, the European Human Rights Committee
considered the application of the right to family and the rights of
aliens. It noted that although the ICCPR does not recognize a
right of an alien to enter or to reside in a particular state, “in
certain circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the
Covenant even in relation to entry or residence, for example, when
considerations of nondiscrimination, prohibition of inhuman
112
treatment and respect for family life arise.”
In accord with this
statement, the Committee also noted the following in its comment
on article 23:
[T]he right to found a family implies, in principle, the
possibility to procreate and live together . . . [and this]
implies the adoption of appropriate measures, both at the
internal level and as the case may be, in cooperation with
other States, to ensure the unity or reunification of
families, particularly when their members are separated
113
for political, economic or similar reasons.
The Committee considered the application of ICCPR article

110. Taveras-Lopez v. Reno, 127 F. Supp. 2d 598, 608 (M.D. Pa. 2000); see also
Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex 13,
at 134, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (Apr. 9, 1981), reprinted in 2 HUM. RTS. L.J. 139 (The
findings and recommendations of the U.N. Human Rights Committee are not
binding upon the U.S. Article 19(6) of the Convention on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights requires states to “facilitate as far as possible the reunion of the
family of a foreign worker” who has legally migrated, while the 1977 European
Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers provides similar protections
for migrant workers’ families.); Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 87, at 219-20.
111. Taveras-Lopez, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
112. Elizabeth Landry, Note & Comment, States As International Law-Breakers:
Discrimination Against Immigrants and Welfare Reform, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1108-09
(1996); see also International Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies 18, P 5 (1992) [hereinafter HRI/GEN]. Drawing from its experience in
reviewing state reports submitted under article 40 of the Covenant, the Human
Rights Committee intends its comments to assist state parties in implementing
their Covenant obligations. Id.
113. Landry, supra note 112, at 1109; see also HRI/GEN, supra note 112, at 2829, P 5.
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17 to a state’s immigration laws that prevented women from
bringing their alien husbands into the country. It held:
[T]he exclusion of a person from a country where close
members of his family are living can amount to an
interference within the meaning of Article 17 . . . .
[Whether the immigration laws are] compatible with the
Covenant depends on whether such interference is either
“arbitrary or unlawful” as stated in Article 17(1), or
conflicts in any other way with the State party’s obligations
114
under the Covenant.
The Committee went on to find that “‘[i]n the present cases,
not only the future possibility of deportation but the existing
precarious residence situation of foreign husbands in Mauritius
represents . . . an interference . . . with the family life of the
115
Mauritian wives and their husbands.’”
In interpreting the content of Article 8 of the European
Convention “respect for family life” with regard to aliens’ entry and
expulsion from European states, the European Court of Human
Rights has consistently held that an illegal immigrant’s interest in
family unity outweighs a State’s interest in enforcing its
116
immigration laws and protecting the “public order.”
In its
decisions, the court recognized that no alien has a right to enter or
reside in a particular country or a right not to be expelled. It
further recognized that the expulsion or refusal of entry of persons

114. Landry, supra note 112, at 1109; see also Report of the Human Rights
Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee Under Article 5(4) of the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Concerning Communication No. R. 9/35, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
134, P 9.2(b)(2)(i)(2) U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981) [hereinafter HRC Report].
115. See Landry, supra note 112, at 1109; HRC Report, supra note 114.
116. Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 87, at 221; see Landry, supra note 112, at
1110-11; see also, e.g., Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 147-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1997);
Lamguindaz v. The United Kingdom, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 213, 215-16 (1993) (Court
report); Moustaquim v. Belgium, Eur. H.R. Rep. 802, 815 (1991) (Court report);
Djeroud v. France, App. 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 68, 79 (1991) (Court report); Berrehab
v. The Netherlands, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322, 331 (1988) (Court report); Abdulaziz
v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 471, 494-95 (1985) (Court report).
Lamguindaz and Djeroud reached friendly settlement with the state party so
references are to the decisions of the European Commission on Human Rights.
Although certainly not binding on the United States, decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights are an invaluable source of international human rights
jurisprudence. The European Court is especially significant because it has been
interpreting fundamental human rights norms under the European Convention
for nearly forty years.
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from or to a country in which their immediate family is resident
117
may violate article 8 of the European Convention. “The right to
cohabitate with one’s family has been held to be a central aspect of
‘family life’ under Article 8 (as well as a core element of the Article
118
12 right to ‘found a family’)” of the European Convention.
European courts have even recognized the right to family unity
for same-sex couples. A Finnish court “found a violation of article
8 [of the European Convention] in the attempted expulsion of a
119
Russian homosexual who was in the country illegally.”
“Noting
his domestic partnership with a Finn, the court deemed the
proposed expulsion an interference with the couple’s ‘private life’
120
and, hence, prohibited by article 8.”
Similarly, where
immigration “authorities had failed to weigh the interests [of a
foreign national, married to an Austrian,] in maintaining his family
life against the general interests of the community in public safety,
the [Constitutional Court of Austria] invalidated the visa-denial
121
under article 8.”
In contrast to European tribunals, U.S. courts have
traditionally been reluctant to incorporate international norms
122
into their interpretation of domestic laws. Many courts, however,
117. See Lamguindaz, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 215-16; Landry, supra note 112, at
1111. Interestingly, the European Court’s position that forced separation may
violate the respect for family life did not change when it considered the attempted
expulsion of a long-time resident “criminal” alien or alien divorced from a
national with whom he had a child. See, e.g., Lamguindaz, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 21516; Moustaquim, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 815; Djeroud, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 79; Berrehab,
11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 331; see also Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 147-48.
118. Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 87 at 220; see Abdulaziz, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. at
10, P 10.
119. See X v. Finland, 1993 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 499 (Sup. Admin. Ct.);
Landry, supra note 112, at 1112. The other part of the decision rested on the fact
that, as a homosexual, he might face inhuman or degrading treatment if he were
returned to Russia.
120. Id.
121. See, X v. Austria, 1993 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 487-88 (Const. Ct.);
Landry, supra note 112, at 1113.
122. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (recalling that the Court
has held that an “[a]ct of Congress . . . is on a full parity with a treaty, and that
when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute,
to the extent of conflict, renders the treaty null”); Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S.
310, 316 (1914) (“[I]t is well settled that when a treaty is inconsistent with a
subsequent act of Congress, the latter will prevail.”). A principle of customary
international law does not preempt a contrary enactment of Congress. See
Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450-51 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[I]n enacting statutes, Congress is
not bound by international law. If it chooses to do so, it may legislate [contrary
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are now considering international law when deciding domestic
123
Moreover, a few federal courts have considered the
cases.
international right to family and family unity when adjudicating
124
immigration law. The Lawrence Court’s reliance on international

to] the limits posed by international law.”) (citation omitted); In re Cuban, 822 F.
Supp. 192, 197-98 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (“Congress in enacting legislative law, is not
bound by international law.”). Thus, “no enactment of Congress can be
challenged on the ground that it violates customary international law.” Comm. of
U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Finally, according to the Restatement of Foreign Relations, “[a]n Act of Congress
supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision of an international
agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supersede the
earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision
cannot be fairly reconciled.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §115(1)(a) (1987).
123. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, International Human Rights and United States Law:
Predictions of a Courtwatcher, 64 ALB. L. REV. 417, 420 (2000). In Cabrera-Alvarez v.
Gonzales, the petitioner sought “cancellation of removal in order to prevent
hardship to his two young children, who are United States citizens.” 423 F.3d
1006, 1007 (9th Cir. 2005). He argued that the immigration judge, in denying
him cancellation of removal, interpreted the “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” standard, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2000), in a manner inconsistent
with international law, specifically Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child, which states that “[i]n all actions concerning children
. . . the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.” Convention
on the Rights of the Child, supra note 84, art. 3(1). The court denied the petition.
In doing so, it recognized “the presumption that Congress intends to legislate in a
manner consistent with international law is a recognized canon of statutory
construction.” Cabrera-Alvarez, 423 F.3d at 1009. However, it held that because
“Congress has the power to ‘legislate beyond the limits posed by international law,’
in some cases a statute’s text will not be susceptible to an interpretation consistent
with international law.” Id. Thus, “an act of Congress should be construed so as
not to conflict with international law where it is possible to do so without
distorting the statute. The statute at issue here limits cancellation of removal to
those who can demonstrate that removal would result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” Id. at 100910 (emphasis in original). It is noteworthy that the United States has not ratified
the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Id. Therefore, the court found “the
Convention is not ‘the supreme Law of the Land’ under the Treaty Clause of the
United States Constitution.” Id. at 1010. In evaluating the petitioner’s claim, the
court did assume that the Convention had attained the status of “customary
international law.” Id. From that point, the analysis rested on the best interests of
the child, rather than the right to family unity. Id. at 1011.
124. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d, 329 F.3d
51 (2d Cir. 2003); Taveras-Lopez v. Reno, 127 F. Supp. 2d 598 (M.D. Pa. 2000)
(holding that Article 23(1) of the ICCPR does not mandate that petitioner,
convicted of aggravated felony, be accorded the opportunity to seek cancellation
of removal); Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), overruled by
Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that customary
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norms invites application of these norms to other areas of the law,
including immigration. Moreover, the Supreme Court has already
held that family unity is a fundamental right protected by the Due
125
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. The Legal and Equitable Implications of Lawrence and Its
Application to Immigration Equality in the United States
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court recognized the existence of and
affirmed the value of same-sex relationships. In addition, although
the Lawrence Court did not treat international consensus as
determinative, it found the international community strongly
supported and confirmed the correctness of its decision to
126
overturn Bowers.
In light of the legal changes described in the
preceding section, there is strong evidence of similar international
support for providing legal recognition to same-sex couples for the
purposes of immigration.
In Lawrence v. Texas, petitioners Lawrence and Garner
challenged the Texas “Homosexual Conduct” law, which
criminalized certain types of sexual intimacy in same-sex couples,
127
but not in different-sex couples.
The Court overruled Bowers v.
128
Hardwick, in which it had found that a Georgia law criminalizing
129
The Court overruled Bowers for
sodomy was constitutional.
international law prohibited arbitrary expulsion and interference with family life).
125. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (plurality opinion);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“The integrity of the family unit has
found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
126. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986)). The Court again established its willingness to look to law in other
countries to support its position in Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1190
(2005). In that case, the Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court’s holding in
State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), finding the execution
of minors unconstitutional. The Court based its decision on its interpretation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, it found its decision was
confirmed by “the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the
world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.” 125 S.
Ct. at 1198. It also acknowledged “the overwhelming weight of international
opinion against the juvenile death penalty.” Id. at 1200. This was reflected in the
laws of other countries which had outlawed or disapproved of application of the
death penalty to juveniles, but also in international treaties including the ICCPR,
the American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, and the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Id. at 1199.
127. 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003).
128. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
129. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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several reasons, including the growing international awareness that
adults should have liberty in choosing partners for consensual
130
intimate relationships.
The Court’s criticism of Bowers has four components. First, the
Bowers Court “misapprehended the claim of liberty there presented
to it” by underestimating the “far-reaching consequences” of
sodomy statutes and framing the issue merely as whether there was
131
a “fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy.”
Second, the Bowers Court relied in its ruling on a definitive
version of history now criticized and rejected by the Lawrence
132
Court.
Specifically, the Lawrence Court rejected the idea that
sodomy laws reflected a tradition in the U.S. of systematic
punishment of homosexual acts, noting that they were instead
consistent with “ensur[ing] . . . coverage if a predator committed a
sexual assault that did not constitute rape as defined by the
criminal law” and “a general condemnation of nonprocreative
133
sex.”
Third, the Bowers Court ignored the general trend towards
permissiveness towards same-sex relations and “an emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons
in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining
134
to sex.” The Court noted that this trend was apparent in the fact
that sodomy laws were rarely enforced by the States that had them,
and that authorities in Britain and the European Court of Human
Rights had found in favor of legalizing consensual homosexual
135
conduct.
Finally, two Supreme Court cases decided after Bowers
undermined its holding—Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
136
137
Pennsylvania v. Casey and Romer v. Evans.
Casey was a due
process case in which the Court reaffirmed that “laws and tradition
afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
138
rearing, and education.”
The Court reasoned that Casey’s
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 572-73.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 569-70.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 572-73.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74 (interpreting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (joint
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guarantee of autonomy extends to those in a homosexual
relationship, who must be allowed to make “the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy . . . central to the liberty
139
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Romer was an equal protection case in which the Court held
140
unconstitutional a law that was “born of animosity” towards
homosexuals and that “had no rational relation to a legitimate
141
governmental purpose.” The Court declined to use Romer alone
to base the Lawrence decision on the Equal Protection Clause,
however, recognizing that such a decision would leave uncertain
the constitutionality of sodomy laws drawn to prohibit the conduct
142
between same-sex and different-sex partners.
The Lawrence Court noted that because Romer and Casey had
weakened the precedent set by Bowers, criticism from other sources
143
takes on greater significance. These “other sources” include legal
scholars and foreign courts and legislatures, many of which have
recognized a right for homosexual adults to engage in “intimate,
144
consensual conduct.”
The Lawrence Court looked outside the
borders of the United States and relied heavily on other tribunals’
analyses in examining the issue of anti-sodomy laws. Justice
Kennedy’s decision noted the developments in England and under
the European Convention on Human Rights to make the point that
there is an international view that anti-sodomy laws violate basic
145
human rights.
Moreover, the Court noted that this trend was
apparent in the fact that sodomy laws were rarely enforced by the
states that had them and that authorities in Britain and the
European Court of Human Rights had found in favor of legalizing
146
consensual homosexual conduct. The Lawrence Court also noted
that many authorities at the time of Bowers, including a committee
advising the British Parliament in 1957 and the European Court of
147
Human Rights, recommended the decriminalization of sodomy.

opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)).
139. Id. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (emphasis added)).
140. Id. (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 575.
143. Id. at 576.
144. Id. at 576-77.
145. Id. at 572-73.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Further, the Lawrence Court imported the concept of Article 8
of the European Convention (right to respect for private life) into
its interpretation of the boundaries of “liberty” protected by the
Due Process Clause. The court held: “The petitioners are entitled
to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
148
conduct a crime.”
The Lawrence Court made clear that in overruling Bowers it was
doing more than decriminalizing an act—it was affirming the right
of gay people to form and sustain loving personal relationships and
to lead their private lives free of government restriction and legal
condemnation. The Court declared that gay couples “are entitled
149
to respect for their private lives.”
It recognized that sodomy
prohibitions wrongly “seek to control a personal relationship
that . . . is within the liberty of persons to choose,” in which
intimate sexuality may be “but one element in a personal bond that
150
is more enduring.”
Likewise, in her concurrence, Justice
O’Connor observed that sodomy laws had been abused to deny gay
people rights in the very context before this Court: “the law ‘legally
sanctions discrimination against [homosexuals]’ . . . in the area[
151
] . . . ‘of family issues . . . .’”
Justice O’Connor noted that the
Constitution is most skeptical of state action that “inhibits personal
152
relationships.”
Crucial to understanding the decision in Lawrence is the
recognition that same-sex relationships deserve the same liberty
rights as other family units. The Lawrence Court explicitly stated
that its ruling was silent on whether a same-sex relationship was
153
entitled to formal recognition in the law. Its reasoning, however,
implies that such recognition might be appropriate where its
absence is so damaging as to actively infringe on the liberty of
“homosexual persons” to choose how and with whom they create a

148. Id. at 578. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
provides a right to respect for one’s “private and family life, his home and his
correspondence,” subject to certain restrictions that are “in accordance with law”
and “necessary in a democratic society.” Landry, supra note 112, at 1110; see also
Arthur S. Leonard, The Impact of International Human Rights Developments on Sexual
Minority Rights, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 525 (2004).
149. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
150. Id. at 567.
151. Id. at 582. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
152. Id. at 580.
153. Id. at 578.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss2/8

36

Ayoub and Wong: Separated and Unequal
04AYOUB.DOC

2006]

1/30/2006 9:41:23 AM

SEPARATED AND UNEQUAL

595
154

“personal bond” (i.e., romantic relationship).
Just as intimate
sexual conduct is an important, if not an integral, part of an
intimate relationship, so too is geographical proximity. Denying a
couple the ability to live in the same country can be as devastating
as criminalizing their sexual conduct. Partners unable to reside
together are forced to separate, relocate to another country,
and/or maintain expensive and emotionally challenging long
distance relationships. Immigration equality provides for the
liberty interest of a committed couple’s desire to live together as a
family unit.
The U.S. government has historically taken the position that
family unity is a worthwhile policy objective for immigration law
155
and that forced separation of family members may be a hardship.
In an attempt to promote family unity, Congress eliminated
numerical restrictions upon immediate family members of U.S.
156
citizens to immigrate to the United States.
Similarly, Congress
created ranking preferences for family-sponsored visas, granting
preference in this order: unmarried sons and daughters of citizens;
spouses and children, and unmarried sons and daughters of
permanent residents; married sons and daughters of citizens;
157
brothers and sisters of adult citizens.
A Select Commission
appointed by Congress to study U.S. immigration policy recognized

154. Id. at 567.
This Article is not the place to argue about the
constitutionality of denying marriage to same-sex couples. While, like Laurence
Tribe, the authors do not wish to “join the veritable cottage industry . . .
developing out of the unremarkable observation that Lawrence might in the end
prove to be [a] halting and limited . . . step forward,” they do want to forestall the
“slippery slope” fears that have proven such a sticking point in meeting the urgent
need for legislation sensitive to the realities of same-sex bi-national couples.
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1950 (2004). It is thus worth noting that the
denial of some rights, such as the ability to stay together in the same country,
impacts couples in a qualitatively different way from others, such as the ability to
file taxes jointly.
155. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2000) (allowing cancellation of removal
for some cases where there is “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the
alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence”); H.R. 440, 108th Cong. (2003) (“To
amend the Immigration and Nationality Act . . . to promote family unity.”).
156. H.R. 440, 108th Cong. (2003).
157. See Marshall L. Cohen, Obtaining Permanent Resident Status Through Family
Relationships, in IMMIGRATION LAW: ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 61, 63
(Study Course No. 38, 1998); cf. Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental Right to
Family Unity: Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community Ties in the Battle of
Plenary Power Versus Aliens’ Rights, 41 VILL. L. REV. 725, 729 (1996).
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the family reunification goal in its recommendations, finding that
reunification of families serves the national interest not only
through the humaneness of the policy itself, but also through the
158
promotion of the public order and well-being of the nation. The
Commission went on to find that, psychologically and socially, the
reunion of family members with their close relatives promotes the
159
health and welfare of the United States.
Later, in debating the
Immigration Act of 1990, several members of Congress voiced their
support for strengthening the family reunification provisions of the
immigration laws. Representative Bonior supported strengthening
the family unity policies: “The wait for family reunification can be
long and painful . . . . Not only is it antifamily to allow such long
separations, it is also counterproductive. For it only encourages
illegal immigration as the best way to become united with loved
160
ones.” Representative McGraph stated that “[f]amily unification
is the cornerstone of immigration to the United States. Prolonging
the separation of spouses from each other . . . is inconsistent with
161
the principles on which this nation was founded.”
Congress should recognize the principles espoused in Lawrence
as further support to enact legislation providing for immigration
equality. As illustrated by the reasoning in Lawrence, it is a very
small step from finding sodomy statutes unconstitutional to
recognizing that same-sex partners must have the same rights to
immigration as opposite-sex married couples. Adoption of the
UAFA would strengthen the privacy rights of same-sex couples to
form and sustain loving personal relationships without
governmental interference, specifically in the form of separation by
exclusion or deportation. Such legislation would also promote U.S.
policy that recognizes the importance of family unity. Just as the
U.S. Supreme Court relied upon foreign tribunals’ analyses in
examining the constitutionality of anti-sodomy laws, Congress
should adopt the practice and policy of eighteen countries’
immigration laws that allow gay citizens and residents to sponsor
their same-sex partners for immigration benefits.

158. See U.S. SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGR. & REFUGEE POL’Y, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 112 (1981).
159. Id.
160. 136 CONG. REC. H8629 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Bonior).
161. Id. at H8631 (statement of Rep. McGrath).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Constitution guarantees gay people the right to choose
how and with whom to create a “personal bond,” to form and
sustain loving personal relationships, and to lead their private lives
free of government restriction and legal condemnation. Countless
bi-national same-sex couples are faced with the painful reality of
serious challenges to their family unification, including forced
separation. Adoption of the UAFA would give effect to the
government’s policy of “family unity,” remedy the unequal
treatment of same-sex partners under U.S. immigration law, align
the U.S. with its foreign allies’ immigration policies, further the
equality guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution and reaffirmed by
Lawrence, and carry out the obligations and duties imposed upon
the U.S. under its international treaty obligations.
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